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Abstract
In practical quantum key distribution, weak coherent state is often used and the channel trans-
mittance can be very small therefore the protocol could be totally insecure under the photon-
number-splitting attack. We propose an efficient method to verify the upper bound of the fraction
of counts caused by multi-photon pluses transmitted from Alice to Bob, given whatever type of
Eve’s action. The protocol simply uses two coherent states for the signal pulses and vacuum for
decoy pulse. Our verified upper bound is sufficiently tight for QKD with very lossy channel, in
both asymptotic case and non-asymptotic case. The coherent states with mean photon number
from 0.2 to 0.5 can be used in practical quantum cryptography. We show that so far our protocol
is the only decoy-state protocol that really works for currently existing set-ups.
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Unlike the classical cryptography, quantum key distribution(QKD)[1, 2, 3] can help two
remote parties to set up the secure key by non-cloning theorem[4]. Further, proofs for
the unconditional security over noisy channel have been given[5, 6, 7, 8]. The security of
practical QKD with weak coherent states has also been shown[9, 11]. However there are still
some limitations for QKD in practice, especially over long distance. In particular, large loss
of channel seems to be the main challenge to the long-distance QKD with weak coherent
states. A dephased coherent state |µeiθ〉 is actually a mixed state of
ρu =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
|µeiθ〉〈µeiθ|dθ =
∑
n
Pn(µ)|n〉〈n| (1)
and Pn(µ) =
µne−µ
n!
. Here µ is a non-negative number. In practice, especially in doing long-
distance QKD, the channel transmittance η can be rather small. If η < (1− e−µ−µe−µ)/µ,
Eavesdropper (Eve) in principle can have the full information of Bob’s sifted key by the
photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack[10]: Eve blocks all single-photon pulses and part of
multi-photon pulses and separates each of the remained multi-photon pulses into two parts
therefore each part contains at least one photon. She keeps one part and sends the other
part to Bob, through a lossless channel.
If the channel is not so lossy, Alice and Bob can still set-up the unconditionally secure
final key with a key rate[11]
r = 1−∆−H(t)− (1−∆)H(t/(1−∆)) (2)
if we use a random classical CSS code[5] to distill the final key[11]. Here t is the detected
flipping error rate, ∆ is the fraction of tagged signals[11], i.e. the fraction for those counts
in cases when Alice sends out a multi-photon pulse. The functional H(x) = −x log2 x− (1−
x) log2(1−x). From the above formula we see that verifying a tight bound for ∆ is the first
important thing in QKD.
Originally, the PNS attack has been investigated where Alice and Bob monitor only
how many non-vacuum signals arise, and how many errors happen. However, it was then
shown[13] that the simple-minded method does not guarantee the final security. It is
shown[13] that in a typical parameter regime nothing changes if one starts to monitor
the photon number statistics as Eve can adapt her strategy to reshape the photon num-
ber distribution such that it becomes Poissonian again. A very important method with
decoy states was then proposed by Hwang[14], where the unconditional verification of the
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multi-photon counting rate is given. Hwang’s decoy-state method can faithfully estimate
the upper bound of ∆ through decoy-pulses, given whatever type of PNS attack. (Remark:
Decoy-state method is not the only solution to the issue. An alternative method is to use
strong refenence light[12].) However, Hwang’s initial protocol[14] does not give a sufficiently
tight bound. For example, in the case of µ = 0.3, by Hwang’s method, the the optimized
verified upper bound of ∆ is 60.4%. As it has been mentioned[14, 15], decoy-state method
can be combined with GLLP[11] to distill unconditionally secure final key. With the value
∆ = 60.4%, by eq(2), the key rate can be rather low in practice. Following Hwang’s work[14],
decoy-state method was then studied by Lo and co-workers [15, 16]. They proposed their
main protocol : Try EVERY Poisson distribution of mixed states in Fock space, i.e., to test
the counting rates of coherent states {|µ′eiθ〉} with ALL possible values of µ′ in one protocol.
In such a way the counting rates of each state |n〉〈n| can be calculated therefore an exact
value of ∆ can be given. However, such a protocol seems to be inefficient in practice, because
it requires infinite number of classes of different coherent states to work as the decoy states.
Prior to this, an idea of using vacuum to test the dark count and using very weak coher-
ent state as decoy state to verify the lower bound of single-photon transmittance had been
shortly stated[16]. However, as it is shown in the Appendix, given a very lossy channel, the
number of single-photon counts of all those decoy states is much less than the dark count.
Even a little bit fluctuation of dark count can totally destroy any meaningful estimation of
single-photon counts. To make a meaningful estimation, the statistical fluctuation of dark
count must be pretty small and this requires an unreasonablly large number of decoy-pulses
which request more than 14 days to produce. In summary, so far no prior art result of
decoy-state can really work in practice.
Here, we propose a new decoy-state protocol which is the only one that really works for
currently existing set-ups. The protocol uses only 3 different states and the verified bound
values are sufficiently tight for long-distance QKD. In the protocol, coherent states with
average photon number µ, µ′ are used for signal pulses and vacuum is used for the decoy
pulse. Since both µ and µ′ are in a reasonable range, pulses produced in both states can
be used to distill the final key. That is to say, both of them can be regarded as the signal
states. Our result uniquely shows that long-distance QKD with decoy states by a real-world
protocol is possible, with a reasonable number of total pulses.
For simplicity, we denote those pulses produced in state |µeiθ〉, |µ′eiθ〉, |0〉 as class Yµ, Yµ′
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and Y0, respectively. In the protocol θ is randomized. Also, Alice mixes the positions of all
pulses therefore no one but Alice knows which pulse belongs to which class in the protocol.
They observe the counting rates of each classes and then verify the upper bounds of counts
caused by multi-photon pulses from class Yµ, Yµ′, respectively. If these values are too large,
they abandon the protocol, otherwise they go on to do key distillations using pulses from
each class of Yµ and Yµ′ by GLLP[11].
We first define the counting rate of any state ρ: the probability that Bob’s detector clicks
whenever a state ρ is sent out by Alice. We disregard what state Bob may receive here. This
counting rate is called as the yield in other literatures[14, 15]. We denote the counting rate
(yield) of vacuum, class Y0, Yµ, Yµ′ by notations s0, Sµ, Sµ′, respectively. These 3 parameters
are observed in the protocol itself: After all pulses are sent out, Bob announces which pulse
has caused a click which pulse has not caused a click. Since Alice knows which pulse belongs
to which class, Alice can calculate the counting rates of each classes of pulses. Therefore we
shall regard s0, Sµ, Sµ′ as known parameters in protocol. The value s0 is counting rate at
Bob’s side when Alice sends vacuum pulses. We shall also call s0 as the vacuum count or
dark count rate.
Their task is to verify the upper bound of ∆, the fraction of multi-photon counts among
all counts caused by pulses in class Yµ and also the upper bound of ∆
′, the fraction of multi-
photon counts among all counts caused by pulses in class Yµ′ . We shall show how they can
deduce the upper values of ∆,∆′ from the values of {s0, Sµ, Sµ′}. We shall focus on ∆ first
and latter obtain ∆′ based on the knowledge of ∆.
For convenience, we always assume
µ′ > µ;µ′e−µ
′
> µe−µ (3)
in this paper. A dephased coherent state |µeiθ〉 has the following convex form:
ρµ = e
−µ|0〉〈0|+ µe−µ|1〉〈1|+ cρc (4)
and c = 1− e−µ − µe−µ > 0,
ρc =
1
c
∞∑
n=2
Pn(µ)|n〉〈n|. (5)
Similarly, state |µ′eiθ〉 after dephasing is
ρµ′ = e
−µ′ |0〉〈0|+ µ′e−µ
′
|1〉〈1|+ c
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
ρc + dρd (6)
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and d = 1 − e−µ
′
− µ′e−µ
′
− cµ
′2e−µ
′
u2e−µ
≥ 0. ρd is a density operator. (We shall only use
the fact that d is non-negative and ρd is a density operator.) In deriving the above convex
form, we have used the fact Pn(µ
′)/P2(µ
′) > Pn(µ)/P2(µ) for all n > 2, given the conditions
of eq.(3). With these convex forms of density operators, it is equivalent to say that Alice
sometimes sends nothing (|0〉〈0|), sometimes sends |1〉〈1|, sometimes sends ρc and sometimes
sends ρd, though Alice does not know which time she has sent out which one of these states.
In each individual sending, she only knows which class the pulse belongs to. We shall
use notations s0, s1, sc, Sµ, Sµ′ , sd for the counting rates of state |0〉〈0|, |1〉〈1|, ρc, ρµ, ρµ′ , ρd,
respectively. Given any state ρ, nobody but Alice can tell whether it is from class Yµ or Yµ′.
Asymptotically, we have
sρ(µ) = sρ(µ
′) (7)
and sρ(µ), sρ(µ
′) are counting rates for state ρ from class Yµ and class Yµ′ , respectively.
We shall use the safest assumption that Eve also controls the the detection efficiency
and dark count of Bob’s detector. We only consider the overall transmittance including the
channel, Bob’s devices and detection efficiency. By eq.(4), we relate ∆ with parameter sc,
the multi-photon counting rate in class Yµ by:
∆ = c
sc
Sµ
. (8)
To verify the upper bound of ∆ for pulses from class Yµ, we only need to verify the upper
bound of sc, the counting rate of mixed state ρc. The task is reduced to formulating sc by
{s0, Sµ, Sµ′}, which are measured directly in the protocol itself. The coherent state ρµ′ is
convexed by ρc and other states. Given the condition of eq.(3), the probability of ρc in state
ρµ′ is larger than that in ρµ. Using this fact we can make a preliminary estimation of sc.
From eq.(6) we immediately obtain
Sµ′ = e
−µ′s0 + µ
′e−µ
′
s1 + c
µ′2e−µ
′
µ2e−µ
sc + dsd. (9)
s0 is known, s1 and sd are unknown, but they are never less than 0. Therefore we have
csc ≤
µ2e−µ
µ′2e−µ′
(
Sµ′ − e
−µ′s0 − µ
′e−µ
′
s1
)
. (10)
We can obtain Hwang’s main result[14] by
csc ≤
µ2e−µ
µ′2e−µ′
(
Sµ′ − e
−µ′s0
)
≤
µ2e−µ
µ′2e−µ′
Sµ′ (11)
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Combining this equation with eq.(8)we have
∆ ≤
µ2e−µSµ′
µ′2e−µ′Sµ
. (12)
This is just eq.(12) in ref.[14]. In the normal case that there is no Eve’s attack, Alice and Bob
will find Sµ′/Sµ =
1−e−ηµ
′
1−e−ηµ
= µ′/µ in there protocol therefore they they can verify ∆ ≤ µe
−µ
µ′e−µ′
,
which is just eq.(13) of Hwang’s work[14]. Our derivation looks significantly simpler than
that in ref.[14].
Having obtained the crude results above, we now show that the verification can be done
more sophisticatedly and one can further tighten the bound significantly. In the inequality
(11), we have dropped terms s1 and sd, since we only have trivial knowledge about s1 and sd
there, i.e., s1 ≥ 0 and sd ≥ 0. Therefore, inequality(10) has no advantage at that moment.
However, after we have obtained the crude upper bound of sc, we can have a larger-than-0
lower bound for s1, provided that our crude upper bound for ∆ given by eq.(11) is not too
large. From eq.(4) we have
e−µs0 + µe
−µs1 + csc = Sµ. (13)
With the crude upper bound for sc given by eq.(11), we have the non-trivial lower bound
for s1 now:
s1 ≥ Sµ − e
−µs0 − csc > 0. (14)
The updated s1 will in return further tighten the upper bound of sc by eq.(10), and the
tightened sc will again update s1 by eq.(14) and so on. After many iterations, the final
values for sc and s1 are given by the simultaneous constraints of of inequalities (14) and
(10). We have the following final bound after solving them:
∆ ≤
µ
µ′ − µ
(
µe−µSµ′
µ′e−µ′Sµ
− 1
)
+
µe−µs0
µ′Sµ
. (15)
Here we have used eq.(8). In the case of s0 << η, if there is no Eve., S
′
µ/Sµ = µ
′/µ. Alice
and Bob must be able to verify
∆ =
µ
(
eµ
′
−µ − 1
)
µ′ − µ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
µ′−µ→0
= µ (16)
in the protocol. This is close to the real value of fraction of multi-photon counts: 1 − e−µ,
given that η << 1. This shows that eq.(15) indeed gives a rather tight upper bound. In our
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derivation, all multi-photon counts from pulses in class Yµ are due to only one mixed state,
ρc. Therefore we only need to calculate one unknown parameter, sc. However, in Ref[15],
they have considered the contribution of each Fock state and there are infinite number of
unknown variables of {sn}. Therefore they need infinite number of different coherent states
in their main protocol[15] while we only need three.
With the upper bound of sc (or, ∆), pulses from class Yµ can be used for key distillation
by GLLP[11]. On the other hand, given sc, we can calculate the lower bound of s1 through
eq.(14). Given s1, we can also calculate the upper bound of ∆
′, the fraction of multi-photon
count among all counts caused by pulses from class Yµ′. Explicitly,
∆′ ≤ 1− (1−∆−
e−µs0
Sµ
)eµ−µ
′
−
e−µ
′
s0
Sµ′
. (17)
The values of µ, µ′ should be chosen in a reasonable range, e.g., from 0.2 to 0.5. To maxi-
mize the key rate, one need to consider the quantities of transmittance, quantum bit error
rate(QBER) and vacuum counts jointly. The optimization is not studied in this paper.
The results above are only for the asymptotic case. In practice, there are statistical
fluctuations, i.e., Eve. has non-negligibly small probability to treat the pulses from different
classes a little bit differently, even though the pulses have the same state. It is insecure if
we simply use the asymptotic result in practice. Our task remained is to verify a tight upper
bound of ∆ and the probability that the real value of ∆ breaks the verified upper bound is
exponentially close to 0.
The counting rate of any state ρ in class Yµ′ now can be slightly different from the counting
rate of the same state ρ from another class, Yµ, with non-negligible probability. We shall use
the primed notation for the counting rate for any state in class Yµ′ and the original notation
for the counting rate for any state in class Yµ. Explicitly, eq.(13,10) are now converted to

e−µs0 + µe
−µs1 + csc = Sµ,
cs′c ≤
µ2e−µ
µ′2e−µ′
(
Sµ′ − µ
′e−µ
′
s′1 − e
−µ′s′0
)
.
(18)
Setting s′x = (1− rx)sx for x = 1, c and s
′
0 = (1 + r0)s0 we obtain
µ′eµ
[
(1− rc)
µ′
µ
− 1
]
∆ ≤ µeµ
′
Sµ′/Sµ − µ
′eµ + [(µ′ − µ)s0 + r1s1 + r0s0]/Sµ. (19)
From this we can see, if µ and µ′ are too close, ∆ can be very large. The important question
here is now whether there are reasonable values for µ′, µ so that our method has significant
advantage to the previous method[14]. The answer is yes.
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GivenN1+N2 copies of state ρ, suppose the counting rate forN1 randomly chosen states is
sρ and the counting rate for the remained states is s
′
ρ, the probability that sρ−s
′
ρ > δρ is less
than exp
(
−1
4
δρ
2N0/sρ
)
and N0 = Min(N1, N2). Now we consider the difference of counting
rates for the same state from different classes, Yµ and Yµ′. To make a faithful estimation for
exponentially sure, we require δρ
2N0/sρ = 100. This causes a relative fluctuation
rρ =
δρ
sρ
≤ 10
√
1
sρN0
. (20)
The probability of violation is less than e−25. To formulate the relative fluctuation r1, rc by
sc and s1, we only need to check the number of pulses in ρc, |1〉〈1| in each classes in the
protocol. That is, using eq.(20), we can replace r1, rc in eq.(18) by 10e
µ/2
√
1
µs1N
, 10
√
1
cscN
,
respectively and N is the number of pulses in class Yµ. Since we assume the case where
vacuum-counting rate is much less than the counting rate of state ρµ, we omit the effect of
fluctuation in vacuum counting, i.e., we set r0 = 0. With these inputs, eq.(18) can now be
solved numerically. The results are listed in the following table. From this table we can see
that good values of µ, µ′ indeed exist and our verified upper bounds are sufficiently tight to
make QKD over very lossy channel. Note that so far this is the only non-asymptotic result
among all existing works on decoy-state. From the table we can see that our non-asymptotic
values are less than Hwang′s asymptotic values already. Our verified values are rather close
to the true values. We have assumed the vacuum count rate s0 = 10
−6 in the calculation.
If s0 is smaller, our results will be even better. Actually, the value of s0 (dark count) can
be even lower than the assumed value here[17, 18]. In the real set-up given by Gobby et
al[17], the light loses a half over every 15km, the devices and detection loss is 4.5% and
s0 ≤ 8.5×10
−7. Given these parameters, we believe that our protocol works over a distance
longer than 120km with with µ = 0.3, µ′ = 0.45 and a reasonable number of total pulses.
In conclusion, following the work by Hwang[14], we have proposed an efficient and feasible
decoy-state method to do QKD over very lossy channel. The main protocol in Ref.[15] is
impractical because it depends on infinite number of pulses. The idea stated in Ref[16]
doesn’t work in practice either because it has implicitly assumed an unreasonablly large
numbe of pulses which require more than 14 days to produce, by the currently existing
technology. Our protocol is the only decoy-state protocol which really works with currently
existing set-ups. The method of this paper can be further developed[19].
Note added: After the earlier versions of this work (quant-ph/0410075) had been
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TABLE I: The verified upper bound of the fraction of tagged pulses in QKD. ∆H is the result from
Hwang’s method. ∆R is the true value of the fraction of multi-photon counts in case there is no
Eve. ∆H and ∆R do not change with channel transmittance. ∆W1 is bound for pulses in class Yµ,
given that η = 10−3. ∆W2 and ∆
′
W2 are bound values for the pulses in class Yµ, Yµ′ respectively,
given that η = 10−4. We assume s0 = 10
−6. The number of pulses is 1010 in class Yµ, Y
′
µ in
calculating ∆W1 and 8 × 10
10 in calculating ∆W2,∆
′
W2. 4 × 10
9 vacuum pulses is sufficient for
class Y0. The bound values will change by less than 0.01 if the value of s0 is 1.5 times larger. The
numbers inside brackets are chosen values for µ′. For example, in the column of µ = 0.25, data
30.9%(0.41) means, if we choose µ = 0.25, µ′ = 0.41, we can verify ∆ ≤ 30.9% for class Yµ.
µ 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35
∆H 44.5% 52.9% 60.4% 67.0%
∆R 18.3% 22.2% 25.9% 29.5%
∆W1 23.4%(0.34) 28.9%(0.38) 34.4%(0.43) 39.9%(0.45)
∆W2 25.6%(0.39) 30.9%(0.41) 36.2%(0.45 ) 41.5%(0.47)
µ′ 0.39 0.41 0.45 0.47
∆H 71.8% 74.0% 78.0% 79.8%
∆R 32.3% 33.7% 36.2% 37.5%
∆′W2 40.1% 42.2% 45.8% 48.6
presente[20], H. K. Lo et al also presented their previously announced results in the arXiv
(quant-ph/0411004)[21]. They claim that they have for the first time made the decoy-state
method efficiently useful in practice. We question their claim as we have shown that none
of their previously announced protocol or idea really works in practice. If, in Ref[21], their
claim is actually based on something different from their previously announced results, since
Ref[21] itself is presented later than our work[20], then at least the phrase “for the first
time” is inappropriate in their claim. To my understanding, Ref[21] itself does not contain
anything new, it is an extended version of their previously announced results. Therefore,
not only the phrase “for the first time” in their claim is inappropriate, but also their whole
claim is inappropriate.
Appendix:
In this Appendix, we give detailed demonstration that the shortly stated idea in Ref[16]
actually doesn’t work. It is stated[16]:“On one hand, by using a vacuum as decoy state,
Alice and Bob can verify the so called dark count rates of their detectors. On the other
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hand, by using a very weak coherent pulse as decoy state, Alice and Bob can easily lower
bound the yield (channel transmittance) of single-photon pulses.” This is to say, there are
two sets of decoy pulses: Set Y0 contains M vacuum pulses |0〉〈0| and set Yv contains N
pulses of very weak coherent state |µv〉〈µv|. They can only observe the total counts of set
Y0 and the total counts of set Yv. By that idea[16], to verify a meaningful lower bound of
s1, the value µv must be less than channel transmittance η. For clarity, we assume zero
dark count first. They can only observe the total counts of pulses in set Yv. In the normal
case when there is no Eve, N decoy pulses in class Yv will cause N(1 − e
−ηµv ) counts.
For the security, one has no other choice but to assume the worst case that all multi-
photon pulses have caused a count. Therefore the lower bound of single-photon counts is
N [1 − e−ηµv − (1 − e−µv − µve
−µv)] = N(ηµv − µ
2
v/2). The lower bound value for s1 is
verified by s1 ≥
N(ηµv−µ2v/2)
Nµve−µv
≈ η − µv/2. Therefore one has to request µv ≤ η here if one
wants to verify s1 ≥ η/2. Now we consider the effect caused by dark counts. Suppose, after
observed the counts of pulses in set Y0, they find that the dark count rate, s0 = 10
−6 for
set Y0. Note that the dark count rate for set Y0 and the dark count rate for set Yv can be
a little bit different due to the stastical fluctuation. Given N pulses of state |µv〉, there are
Ne−µv vacuum pulses and N(1−e−µv ) non-vacuum pulses. Alice does not know which pulse
is vacuum which pulse is non-vacuum. They can only observe the number of total counts
(nt) caused by N decoy pulses in set Yv, which is the summation of dark counts, n0, the
number of single-photon counts n1 and the number of multi-photon counts, nm, of those N
decoy pulses in set Yv. After observed the number of total counts nt, they try to estimates
n1 by the formula nt = n0 + n1 + nm, with n0 = Ns
′
0e
−µv and the worst-case assumption of
nm = N(1− e
−µv − µve
−µv). The value s′0 is the dark count rate for set Yv and the value s
′
0
is never known exactly. They only know the approximate value, s′0 ≈ s0 = 10
−6. Consider
the case η = 10−4. The expected value of n1 + nm is N(1 − e
−ηµ) ≤ 10−8N . Meanwhile,
the expected number of dark counts is around 10−6N . Since the expected number of dark
counts there is much larger than the expected number of n1 + nm, a little bit fluctuation of
dark counts will totally destroy the estimation of the value n1+nm therefore totally destroy
the estimation of n1. To make a faithful estimation, we request the fluctuation of dark
count to be much less than 10−8N , e.g., in the magnitude order of 10−9N . This is to say,
one must make sure that the relative fluctuation of dark counts is less than 0.1%, with a
probability exponentially close to 1 (say, 1 − e−25). This requires N larger than 1014. The
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system repetition rate is normally less than 8×107 in practice. Producing 1014 decoy pulses
needs more than 14 days.
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